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Introduction
Share repurchase is a phenomenon that has 
recently been thoroughly studied around the 
world. Despite being seen as a substitution for 
dividends and a tool for distributing excess cash, 
it would appear that there are more reasons 
for repurchasing shares and more complex 
problems than only distributing excess cash to 
shareholders. The bulk of the research concerns 
the market reaction to the announcement 
and implementation of share repurchase 
programmes. We attempt to ascertain the 
market reaction to the announcement of share 
repurchases and to determine the reasons for 
the reaction. We assume that share repurchase 
programmes might be explained by the agency 
theory or signalling theory. We expect that 
share repurchases convey valuable information 
to the investors because of the separation 
of ownership and management. We seek to 
identify what kind of information the share 
repurchase conveys.
Although we are aware that a considerable 
amount of research concerning share 
repurchases already exists (including the 
situation in Poland), the originality of our 
approach is that we conducted our research into 
an alternative system of trading on the Warsaw 
Stock of Exchange (WSE): NewConnect. All 
of the research for Polish companies thus 
far has concerned the main market of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. We are the fi rst to 
undertake research into the alternative trade 
system (NewConnect). The main market of the 
WSE has been in operation since 1990 and is 
dedicated to big and mature companies with 
a capitalization of over 15 million euros. At the 
end of 2016 approximately 400 companies were 
listed. Obviously, such companies are ready to 
distribute cash to shareholders. NewConnect 
began in 2007 as an alternative to trading 
on the WSE and is dedicated to innovative, 
growing companies with prospects of further 
intense growth; 400 companies are listed. The 
NewConnect is dedicated to relatively small 
companies with higher investment risks (Pauka 
& Żyła, 2017). According to Damodaran (2001, 
p. 927) companies in a growth stage have 
no incentive to get rid of cash (as a dividend 
or a share repurchase). The phenomenon of 
growth companies transferring cash was the 
basis of our interest in share repurchases on 
NewConnect.
Our research contributes to the payout 
policy and one of the greatest values is its 
attempt to identify the market reaction to share 
repurchases implemented by young, small 
and innovative companies in an emerging 
economy and attempt to explain what 
information is conveyed by a share repurchase 
announcement.
64 buyback implementations over the 
period 2007 to 2016 were identifi ed and an 
analysis was carried out on them. No database 
is available, so all the data was gathered by 
the authors manually. In this study, cumulative 
average abnormal returns were applied 
to identify the market reaction (dependent 
variable). We try to explain the market reaction 
by employing the signalling and the agency 
theory. In investigating the factors which drive 
investors’ behaviour we applied the regressions 
model. We employed some explanatory 
variables describing the agency theory and 
signalling hypotheses: relative payout, market 
to book ratio, operational cash fl ow, and 
debt ratio. The hypotheses are formulated in 
section 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: section 1 presents a review of literature 
on share repurchase and the market reaction 
and reasons to implement share repurchase. 
Section 2 presents the data and methodology, 
variable description and statistics about the 
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sample in this study. Section 3 presents 
empirical data and analysis; in particular the 
cumulative abnormal returns around share 
repurchase results. Section 4 presents the 
results and discussion of the multivariate 
regression analysis. The paper is then 
summarized in Section 5.
1. Literature Review
Announcements of open market repurchase 
programmes have recently become common 
not only in the United States but also in many 
other countries. Despite the fact that a large 
number of researchers have empirically 
analysed share repurchase programmes, 
several pertinent questions remain valid: How 
does the share price react to repurchase 
announcements? What determinants does the 
price reaction depend on?
Our research problems stems from the 
Fama’s (1970) effi cient market hypothesis 
(EMH), which states that prices in the market 
incorporate and refl ect all relevant information 
which may impact a stock.
Most of the research, inter alia Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Comment and Jarrell, 
(1991), Ikenberry et al. (1995), McNally (1999), 
Kahle (2002), Hackethal and Zdantchouk 
(2006), Wang and Johnson (2008), Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002), Będowska-Sójka (2003), 
Gryglewicz (2004), Gurgul and Majdosz (2005), 
and Pieloch (2011), demonstrates that the 
announcement of a share repurchase could be 
a strong signal to the capital market, and could 
trigger a statistically signifi cant increase in the 
market prices of the shares.
Empirical results of cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) following share 
repurchase announcement programmes 
indicate that the results vary across different 
countries. For example for Germany and 
Japan, CAAR is about 6%, for the United 
States, Australia, Canada and Korea it is much 
lower – approximately 3%, while the United 
Kingdom and Hong Kong are at the lowest end 
at around 1% cumulative average abnormal 
return (Hackethal & Zdantchouk, 2006, p. 131). 
These effects are relatively high in Poland – 
5-6% (Będowska-Sójka, 2003; Gryglewicz, 
2004). The market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements means that investors are 
convinced that the stock markets are effi cient 
and the share repurchase programmes convey 
important information. The market reaction 
proves that share repurchase announcement 
enhance stock market effi ciency (Busch & 
Obernberger, 2017).
There are several theories that interpret the 
observation that open market share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive 
abnormal stock return, such as information 
signalling theory and agency theory. In signalling 
models, as proposed by Bhattacharya (1979) 
and Miller and Rock (1985), cash transferred to 
shareholders conveys some positive information 
about a firm’s future earnings. Asquith and 
Mullins (1986), Ikenberry et al. (1995) and 
D’Mello and Shroff (2000) argue that signalling 
theory is the most important explanation for 
share repurchase announcement returns in 
the U.S. According to the signalling hypothesis, 
fi rms repurchase their shares in order to signal 
that the firm is currently undervalued (Mitchell & 
Robinson, 1999; Mitchell & Dharmawan, 2007; 
Akyol & Foo, 2013). Therefore, the likelihood of 
a repurchase should be greater for companies 
with a lower valuation (as measured by Tobin’s 
Q, the market-to-book ratio, or previous share 
price performance), and it should be greater 
when informational asymmetries between 
managers and investors are more pronounced. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) observe a strong negative 
relationship between the market-to-book ratio 
prior to a share repurchase announcement 
and the magnitude of positive abnormal returns 
thereafter. The share price reaction caused 
by a repurchase announcement should be 
inversely related to the measures of valuation 
and informational asymmetry.
Another aspect of share repurchase 
motivations which explains abnormal returns is 
related to agency conflicts and the free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). 
Agency problems usually refer to a confl ict of 
interest between a company’s management 
(agents) and the company’s stockholders 
(principals). Cash distributed either in dividends 
or through share repurchase programmes 
reduces the likelihood that managers will invest 
in projects with a negative net present value, 
and therefore reduces agency costs. Share 
repurchases are considered much more volatile 
and a more discretionary method of cash payout 
than dividends (Jagannathan et al., 2000). 
Share repurchases constitute on average much 
larger payouts than dividends and thus could be 
a better tool to decrease a company’s excess 
funds. The manager, acting as the agent for 
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the shareholders (principals), is supposed to 
make decisions that will maximize shareholder 
wealth. But it is in the manager’s best interest 
to maximize his own wealth. The differing aims 
of agents and principals in such an agency 
relation give rise to a number of associated 
costs: hidden information, hidden action, moral 
hazard, and controlling costs. Agency problems 
can be mitigated by share repurchases. Share 
repurchase as a tool for distributing cash fl ow, 
diminishing the cash holding and increasing 
fi nancial leverage reduces the agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986). By this argument, firms with 
higher cash holdings, higher levels of free cash 
flow, fewer profitable investment opportunities 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q or the market-to-
book ratio), or lower leverage, should be more 
likely to announce a repurchase programme. 
The market should also react more positively 
to share repurchase announcements made by 
these companies. 
There has been some research explaining 
the determinants of market reaction to share 
repurchase announcements. The study of Gan 
et al. (2017) on Chinese market reveals that the 
market responds most favorably to repurchases 
that are announced by high-growth and 
undervalued fi rms but the market reaction is not 
related to profi tability, leverage, price to earnings 
ratio and executive stock options. The empirical 
evidence of the research conducted on the 
German market by Hackethal and Zdantchouk 
(2005) strongly favors the undervaluation signal 
hypothesis and thereby confi rms the results 
obtained for U.S. market (Ikenberry et al., 1995; 
Comment & Jarrel, 1991). The results of the 
studies conducted on the Polish market do not 
support the undervaluation hypothesis.
Gryglewicz (2004) investigated market 
reaction to announcements of share 
repurchases and dividends on the Polish 
market (1997-2000) and analysed what factors 
determine the market reaction. His study 
confi rmed that market reacts positively to 
announcements of both payout instruments, 
however the average abnormal returns are 
higher for share repurchases than for dividends 
(6% versus 2%). The conducted regression 
analysis confi rmed that only one factor – the 
amount of payout is statistically signifi cant. 
Therefore Gryglewicz (2004) concluded that 
„excess returns seem to be driven solely by 
the amount of cash distribution regardless of 
the method used”. Będowska-Sójka (2003) 
conducted research on share repurchases 
announced on the Polish market over the 
period 1998-2002. Her results of regression 
analysis show that there is a stronger market 
reaction to the announcement of share 
repurchase published by smaller companies 
which are characterized by greater information 
asymmetry. She confi rmed also a positive 
market reaction to the repurchase of a greater 
share stake.
The study adopted the explanatory 
variables recommended in the literature. 
Tab. 1 refers to the relationship between the 
discussed theories and selected variables 
which could determine cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding the date of open market 
repurchase announcements.
With regard to prior research, we formulated 
the following hypotheses:
H1: the relative payout level is positively 
related to abnormal returns following an 
announcement of open-market repurchase 
programmes;
H2: the market to book ratio level is 
Variable Theory Expected sign
Amount of payout Signaling hypothesis/ agency theory +/-
Market to book ratio Signaling hypothesis -
Operational cash fl ow Agency theory (agency costs of free cash fl ow) +
Debt ratio Agency theory (marginal cost of external financing) -
Source: authors’ compilation based on Gryglewicz (2004, p. 22)
Tab. 1: Relationship between discussed theories and selected variables
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negatively related to abnormal returns following 
an announcement of open-market repurchase 
programmes;
H3: the operational cash fl ow level is 
positively related to abnormal returns following 
an announcement of open-market repurchase 
programmes;
H4: the debt ratio level is negatively related 
to abnormal returns following an announcement 
of open-market repurchase programmes.
To reiterate, in this paper we attempt 
to determine the market reaction to the 
announcement of share repurchase and the 
reasons for it. As such, the aim of this paper 
is to examine the market reaction to the share 
repurchase announcements and to investigate 
the reasons for it. But the investigated reasons 
we connect with two dominant theories: 
signaling theory and agency theory.
While the problem in literature and in 
previous research is not new, our research is 
focused on an alternative trading system to the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange – NewConnect. The 
main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange has 
been in operation since 1990 and is dedicated to 
big and mature companies with a capitalization 
higher than 15 million euros. Currently there 
are approximately 400 companies listed on the 
main market Warsaw Stock Exchange. The 
alternative trading system, NewConnect, on the 
other hand, has been operating since 2007 and 
is dedicated to innovative, growing companies, 
with prospects for further intense growth, with 
almost 400 companies listed.
According to the business life cycle 
concept, young and growing companies should 
not get rid of cash, and if a company buys its 
shares back, the main reason is to signal good 
investment opportunities.
2. Methodology
The research sample is constructed by 
identifying all the announcements of intention 
to repurchase shares reported by companies 
listed on NewConenct, which were then 
implemented. The data are collected manually 
by analysing all current reports announced 
by the companies from 30th of August, 2007 
through to the 30th of June, 2016 (there were 
approx. 12,000 current reports analysed). 
The reason for selecting this time period is 
because the 30th of August, 2007 is the date 
when NewConnect has started.
We identifi ed 75 buyback announcements 
issued by 67 companies from different industries. 
Of those 67 companies nine announced buyback 
more than once. In these cases, we focused 
only on the fi rst share repurchase programme 
implementation. There were some companies 
that announced only share repurchase 
programme without implementing them. Further 
analysis was also restricted to the buyback 
programmes that were not only announced but 
also implemented. Finally the sample contains 
64 announcements of share repurchase 
programmes which were implemented (from 
the initial group of 67 companies we excluded 
three companies that announced buyback only, 
i.e. without actual implementation). 
The sample is not a random sample but it 
comprises all share repurchase programmes that 
were not only announced but also implemented 
by the companies listed on NewConnect over 
the period of 30.08.2007-30.06.2016.
To be included in the sample, the 
observation had to satisfy the following criteria:
 the company had to be listed on 
NewConnect during the period January 
2007 to June 2016;
 the share repurchase was an open market 
repurchase programme;
 the company disclosed the amount to 
be spent over the duration of the share 
repurchase programme;
 the date of the initial announcement was 
possible to identify.
The data was drawn from the companies’ 
current reports, biannual reports and annual 
reports, and the regulators’ website. There 
is no available database covering buyback 
announcements. All the data was hand-
collected. The fi nancial data refers to the year 
before the share repurchase was announced.
The aim of our paper is to analyse the market 
reaction to a share repurchase announcement.
The fi rst step was to calculate the daily 
returns for both individual shares as well as the 
market index. The following formula was used:
  Pit – Pi(t–1)
     Pi(t–1)
Rit = × 100
 
(1)
where:
Rit – returns on a share i at time t,
Pit – price of the stock i at time t,
Pi(t–1) – price of the stock i at time t-1.
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The methodology for calculating abnormal 
returns is based on the work of Brown and 
Warner (1985). Due the fact that some of the 
companies were listed on NewConnect during 
the period shorter than one year, the rate 
of return adjusted by the market (Brown & 
Warner, 1985) was adopted as the basis for the 
calculations:
ARit = Rit – Rmt (2)
where:
ARit –  abnormal market adjusted returns on 
stock i at time t,
Rit –  denotes the stock return of company i for 
day t,
Rmt –  denotes the market return for day t.
Furthermore i = 1,...,n; t = 1,...,T.
To check the null hypothesis about 
zero average abnormal returns against the 
alternative that average abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero, a test based on 
the t-statistic was used. We checked the null 
hypothesis for all the days within the event 
window.
The Average Abnormal Returns on day t 
was calculated using the following equation:
AARt = ARi,t
1
n
n
t=1Σ  (3)
where:
AARt – Average Abnormal Returns on day t,
ARit – abnormal returns on stock i at time t.
After calculating the average abnormal 
returns over a given time, the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) was 
calculated. CAAR from day 1 to day k is defi ned 
as:
CAARt = AARt
k
t=1Σ  (4)
where:
CAARt –  cumulative average abnormal returns 
for k-th period,
AARit –  average abnormal returns on day t.
To examine the sources of market 
reaction to share repurchase announcements, 
a regression analysis was used. The aim of the 
regression presented here is to fi nd sources of 
market reaction upon announcements of share 
repurchases. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
surrounding the date of each announcement in 
the sample.
Finally we used the following regression 
model: 
CAARi,t = α + β1PAYi,t + β2MTBi,t +
+ β3OCFi,t + β4DEBTi,t + εi,t 
(5)
In our study we focused on four independent 
variables:
 the relative payout, measured as the value 
of the announced disbursement scaled by 
the company’s market capitalization five 
days before the announcement (PAY),
 the market value to book value ratio (MTB), 
i.e. the relation of the market value to 
book value from the fi fth day before the 
announcement,
 the operational cash fl ow variable, 
calculated by dividing operational cash fl ow 
from the year prior to the announcement by 
the asset value at the end of the previous 
year (OCF),
 the debt ratio (DEBT), calculated as debt 
divided by assets form the last quarter 
before the announcement.
The variable of relative payout (PAY) 
was used to capture the differences 
in the size of disbursements among 
individual announcements. We expected 
to obtain a positive relation with abnormal 
returns surrounding the dates of payout 
announcements. 
The market value to book value ratio (MTB) 
can show the level of under- and overvaluation 
and therefore can test the undervaluation 
hypothesis. But the market value to book 
value ratio is also a measure of investment 
opportunities. When the MTB is higher than 1.0, 
then companies can increase their capital stock 
with a lower cost. They have more investment 
opportunities (can have more investment 
projects with a lower rate of return because 
the cost of capital is lower). We expected to 
obtain a negative relation with abnormal returns 
around payout announcements.
The operational cash fl ow variable (OCF) 
refl ects the cash fl ow hypothesis of agency 
theory. The higher the cash fl ow, the higher 
the agency costs. In such a case, the decision 
to distribute cash fl ow to shareholders can 
diminish agency costs. We expected to obtain 
a positive cash fl ow relation with abnormal 
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returns around payout announcements.
The debt ratio (DEBT) estimates the capital 
structure motives. Companies which are less 
leveraged have a lower opportunity to benefi t 
from a debt-to-equity ratio. The lower the debt-
to-equity ratio before the share repurchase, the 
more there are benefi ts of increasing debt-to-
equity ratio and fi nancial leverage. We expected 
to obtain a negative relation with abnormal 
returns around payout announcements.
3. Empirical Data and Analysis
3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The basic data describing our sample is 
included in Tabs. 2 and 3. The data in Tab. 2 
presents the frequency and the size of share 
repurchase programmes on NewConnect.
The fi rst share repurchase programme 
was implemented a year after NewConnect 
was established, i.e. 2008. This came four 
years after share repurchase was permitted 
in line with the Polish Code of Commercial 
Companies, and after public companies 
from the main market of the WSE started to 
implement share repurchase programmes. The 
peak of share repurchasing was in the period 
of 2011-2014, with 53 companies implementing 
share repurchase programmes and the total 
cash transferred to shareholders more than 
22m euros (approximately PLN 90m). The total 
value of cash transferred to shareholders in 
2008-2016 amounted to 35m euros (PLN 140m) 
by 64 companies.
According to Gryglewicz (2004) a total of 
47m euros (PLN 188m) were transferred by 36 
share repurchasing companies from the main 
market of the WSE in the four-year period of 
1997-2000 alone. Comparing the mean value 
of share repurchase programmes from the main 
market of the WSE with those from NewConnect, 
the former was approximately 1,305,000 euros, 
while the latter was about 550,000 euros. 
It is apparent that the mean value of share 
repurchase programmes on NewConnect is 
almost three times smaller than that of the main 
market of the WSE. Even the mean value of 
IPOs is ten times smaller on NewConnect than 
on the main market of the WSE.
Tab. 3 provides descriptive statistics of the 
sample. The descriptive statistics refer to the 
fi nancial situation of the companies in the year 
before their share repurchase programme was 
announced.
There is a wide diversity in the fi nancial 
standing of share repurchasing companies 
from NewConnect. The high standard deviation 
value and the differences between the mean 
and median prove that it is diffi cult to describe 
the average company implementing share 
repurchase programmes.
Following the defi nition of small and 
medium enterprises included in the European 
Union recommendation 2003/361, we found 
that most of the companies repurchasing their 
shares are small and medium. Only 2 out of 64 
companies are big (3%).
Among the companies listed on 
NewConnect implementing share repurchase 
programmes there are fi rms with very high 
(70) and very low (0.03) liquidity current ratios 
with an average (mean and median) much 
higher than the optimal value of 1.8. Similarly, 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Number of 
announcements 0 1 3 3 11 14 11 17 3 1
Total payout 
(thousands of EUR) 0 189 367 1,925 3,622 5,373 6,060 7,427 8,983 1,250
Mean value of share 
repurchase payout
(thousands of EUR)
0 189 122 642 329 384 551 437 2,994 1,250
Median value of share 
repurchase payout
(thousands of EUR)
0 189 125 375 250 343 437 250 243 1,250
Source: authors’ calculations
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of share repurchase programmes on NewConnect
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an analysis of descriptive statistics for quick 
ratios revealed six companies (9%) with current 
liquidity ratio lower than 1.0. Therefore, we can 
conclude that when taking liquidity into account, 
the population of companies is diverse.
Descriptive statistics for profi tability ratios 
also confi rm a high disparity and sample 
diversity. There were seven companies 
(11%) with negative profi tability. Although the 
repurchasing companies were profi table, only 
40 out of 64 (61%) never paid dividends while 
being public (not only in the year that a share 
repurchase programme was implemented).
Most of the repurchasing companies 
were only slightly leveraged – using only 
approximately 30% of debt. Nine companies 
(14%) had a leverage ratio higher than 50%.
The fi nal conclusion regarding the basic 
features of the companies repurchasing shares 
on NewConnect over the period 2007-2016 is 
that the analysed population is highly diversifi ed 
in terms of their fi nancial situations. However, 
this sample diversity might be explained by the 
relatively long period of analysis (2007-2016) 
and the changing macroeconomic conditions 
(including a fi nancial crisis period).
Ratio
N (number 
of observa-
tions)
Formula Min. Mean Median Max. Standard deviation
Size I 
(thousands of EUR) 64 Total assets 42.0 6,875.0 2,880.0 112,190.0 14,850.0
Size II 
(thousands of EUR) 64 Sales revenue 32.0 5,890.0 2,370.0 52,460.0 10,550.0
Liquidity - current 
ratio 64
Current assets to short term 
liabilities 0.03 5.8 2.9 70.4 9.7
Liquidity –
quick ratio 64
Cash and receivables to 
short term liabilities 0.03 4.7 2.0 7.02 9.6
Cash ratio 64 Cash to the investment expenditure 0.01 3.40 1.13 37.50 7.3
ROS (%) 64 Net profi t to sales revenue -6,971.0 -101.0 5.1 70.0 872.6
ROA (%) Net profi t to total assets -13,520.0 -200.6 6.4 68.0 1,691.4
ROE (%) 64 Net profi t to equity -77.0 -11.9 8.4 125.0 225.5
Leverage (%) 64 Total debt to Total Assets 1.0 42.7 25.3 93.4 114.5
M/BV 64 Market value to book value -0.69 3.3 1.8 33.4 5.2
OCF to Investment 64 Operating cash fl ows to investment expenditure -214.83 -2.3 0.45 17.43 27.49
Source: authors’ calculations
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics of NewConnect repurchasing companies
Days (-1;+1) (-2;+2) (-3;+3) (-4;+4) (-5;+5)
CAAR value 3.15%** 5.07%*** 4.71%** 4.62%** 6.01%**
t-statistic 2.4609 2.9084 2.6432 2.1613 2.6388
p value 0.0167 0.0051 0.0104 0.0346 0.0105
Source: authors’ calculations
Note: Signifi cant at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 4: Cumulative abnormal returns around the share repurchase announcement day
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3.3 Independent Variables
Tab. 5 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the data used as independent variables in the 
regression analysis. The descriptive statistics 
refer to the fi nancial situation of the companies 
in the year before a share repurchase 
programme was announced.
As the results of the descriptive statistics 
show, the data is highly diversifi ed in terms 
of all the variables. When we consider the 
maximum value and the upper quartile for PAY, 
MTB and DEBT we can observe extremely high 
differences (for the PAY variable the maximum 
value is almost 10 times higher than the value 
from the upper quartile; for the MTB variable the 
maximum value is more than 10 times higher). 
But again this might be explained by the sample 
diversity and the long period of analysis.
To be able to understand better the 
multivariate regression analysis we calculated 
the correlation coeffi cient. Due the fact that the 
variables are not normally distributed, Spearman 
rank coeffi cient was used in this analysis. Tab. 6 
shows the correlations between each pair of 
variables, which measure the strength of the 
linear relationship between them.
3.2 Market Reaction
As we expected, the market reacted positively 
to announcements of share repurchases 
made by the analysed companies listed on 
NewConnect. Tab. 4 presents the cumulative 
average abnormal returns in a 3-, 5-, 7-, 9- and 
11-day window centred on the share repurchase 
announcement dates.
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
surrounding the date of share repurchase are 
signifi cant at standard levels of confi dence in all 
the analysed event windows (3-, 5-, 7-, 9-, 11-
day). The cumulative average abnormal returns 
drop to their lowest value in the 3-day window 
– approximately 3.15%, while the highest is in 
the 11-day window – approximately 6%. The 
highest statistically signifi cant CAARs value is 
in the 5-day window (approximately 5%). 
Compared to other studies conducted for 
the main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
our results are not high (Gryglewicz, 2004) 
shows cumulative abnormal returns at about 
4.8% for the 5-day window). However, they 
do seem to be quite high compared to other 
studies conducted for more developed capital 
markets: Ikenberry et al. (1995) present 3.54% 
abnormal returns in the 5-day window for the 
U.S. capital market, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) 
show 1.1% in the same day window for British 
capital market, Dumont et al. (2004) confi rm 
approximately 1.8% for the Swiss capital 
market, and Li and McNally (2007) measure 
3.6% for the Canadian capital market.
It should be noted that the value of CAAR 
during the 3 days surrounding the share 
repurchase announcement also vary across 
different countries. For instance open market 
transactions by US corporations were found by 
virtually all the studies to result in much smaller 
abnormal returns of approximately 3% (Grullon 
& Michaelly, 2002) – CAR (-1;+1) = 2.7%; 
McNally (1999) – CAR (-1;+1) = 2.5%). Also, 
Hackethal and Zdantchouk (2006) observe that 
open market repurchase announcements are 
four times higher in Germany than in the USA 
(approximately 12%). Our result of 3.17% is 
similar to the results confi rmed by researchers 
for the US market but much smaller than the 
German results.
Min. Mean Median Lower quartile
Upper
quartile Max.
Std 
deviation
PAY 0.0007 0.1410 0.0913 0.0364 0.1869 1.041 0.1653
MTB 0.0600 3.3624 1.8196 0.9092 3.3768 36.092 5.4154
OCF -0.4335 0.0380 0.0001 -0.0836 0.1460 0.814 0.1972
DEBT 0.0140 0.4269 0.2534 0.1156 0.4229 9.337 1.1480
Source: authors’ calculations
Tab. 5: Descriptive statistics of independent variables
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The only statistically signifi cant (p < 0.01) 
relationships are observed between the 
variables PAY and MTB, and between MTB and 
OCF. Taking into the consideration the results 
we might conclude that more undervalued 
companies listed on NewConnect pay out higher 
amount of money through share repurchases 
programmes. On the other hand the companies 
with higher market value to book value ratio 
have bigger amount of operating cash fl ow. 
Taking into the consideration the results of the 
correlation matrix presented in Tab. 6, we can 
conclude that the low correlation of independent 
variables justifi es further analysis.
4. Results and Discussion
Firstly, for the estimation of parameters in 
model (5) a bootstrap method was used due 
the fact the data is not a random sample and 
it is also very heterogeneous. So, there was 
generated 10,000 random subsamples with 
repetition with 30 observations to precise 
the distribution of t-statistic of regression 
parameters. For each sample the regression 
parameters for model (5) were estimated and 
the corresponding t-statistics were saved to 
build their empirical distributions. Then the 
original sample was used again and from the 
data its parameters were estimated and their 
t-statistics were compared with 2.5% and 
97.5% empirical percentiles from Tab. 7 to 
test their signifi cance. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative average abnormal return 
surrounding share repurchase announcements 
in 3-, 5-, 7-, 9- and 11-day windows centred 
on the announcement dates. The explanatory 
variables are PAY, MTB, OCF, DEBT defi ned 
above in section 3.
The fi nal estimates of regression parameters 
are presented in Tab. 8. There are also values 
of Durbin-Watson statistic to test the residual 
autocorrelation. As all of them are close to 2, 
there is no autocorrelation.
The results of the analysis indicate that 
no one analyzed relation between selected 
variables and cumulative average abnormal 
returns surrounding share repurchase 
announcements is statistically signifi cant.
Variables PAY MTB OCF DEBT
PAY 1.0000
MTB -0.5937** 1.0000
OCF -0.2416 0.3534** 1.0000
DEBT -0.1446 0.0129 0.2101 1.0000
Source: authors’ calculations
Note: Signifi cant at * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
CAAR (-1;+1) CAAR (-2;+2) CAAR (-3;+3) CAAR (-4;+4) CAAR (-5;+5)
Explanatory 
variable 2.5 % 97.5 % 2.5 % 97.5 % 2.5 % 97.5 % 2.5 % 97.5 % 2.5 % 97.5 %
Constant -1.23 2.82 -1.92 2.54 -2.01 2.94 -2.20 2.83 -1.47 3.37
PAY -1.71 1.51 -1.53 1.75 -1.91 2.02 -2.60 1.94 -2.59 1.50
MTB -1.97 2.07 -1.46 1.98 -2.78 2.30 -2.38 1.08 -4.17 1.23
OCF -1.94 2.75 -1.88 3.92 -2.06 3.88 -1.81 3.18 -1.28 4.02
DEBT -1.53 2.93 -1.05 3.33 -1.06 3.47 -1.15 3.68 -0.93 2.88
Source: authors’ calculations
Note: Signifi cant at * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Tab. 6: Correlation matrix of the independent variables
Tab. 7: Percentiles of empirical distributions of t-statistics
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In order to examine if one variable alone can 
show any differences in the market reaction to 
a share repurchase announcement, we applied 
a univariate regression analysis by dropping all 
other variables apart from one. The results are 
presented in Tab. 9.
The estimates show that the market reacts 
solely to the MTB in two windows: window 
(-1,+1) with beta 0.001 (p < 0.10), window 
(-2,+2) with beta 0.019 (p < 0.10). Therefore 
the analysis gives an evidence of a signifi cant 
positive relationship between fi rm’s MTB ratio 
and both CAAR(-1;+1) and CAAR(-2;+2). 
However, the fi ndings are contrary to the initial 
assumption. These results suggest that the 
higher the market-to-book ratio the higher the 
expected market reaction to a share repurchase 
announcement, but only in a very short term – 
the 3-day and 5-day windows.
The results do not support the 
undervaluation hypothesis on NewConnect, 
but are in line with Będowska-Sójka (2003) and 
Gryglewicz (2004) who also did not support the 
undervaluation hypothesis for the main market 
of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
For the remaining variables (PAY, OCF, 
DEBT), the univariate regression analysis 
shows no signifi cant impact on market reaction.
Explanatory 
variable
CAAR (-1;+1) CAAR (-2;+2) CAAR (-3;+3) CAAR (-4;+4) CAAR (-5;+5)
Beta T-statistic Beta T-statistic Beta T-statistic Beta T-statistic Beta T-statistic
Constant 0.035 1.64 0.043 1.55 0.043 1.48 0.069 1.98 0.087 2.44
PAY -0.040 -0.35 -0.038 -0.26 -0.045 -0.30 -0.170 -0.94 -0.166 -0.89
MTB 0.000 0.12 0.001 0.19 -2.506E-5 -0.01 -0.004 -0.90 -0.007 -1.51
OCF 0.014 0.20 0.189 2.02 0.185 1.93 0.159 1.37 0.308 2.59
DEBT 0.001 0.06 0.008 0.38 0.014 0.70 0.020 0.80 0.018 0.72
DW-statistic 1.9012 1.93 1.722 1.704 1.611
F-statistic 0.092 1.415 1.288 0.802 2.099
Source: authors’ calculations
Explanatory 
variable
CAAR (-1;+1) CAAR (-2;+2) CAAR (-3;+3) CAAR (-4;+4) CAAR (-5;+5)
Const. Beta Const. Beta Const. Beta Const. Beta Const. Beta
PAY 0.038 -0.042 0.058 -0.054 0.052 -0.023 0.058 -0.080 0.073 -0.093
F-Test/
R-Sq 0.591 0.005 0.609 0.004 0.834 0.001 0.531 0.006 0.492 0.008
MTB 0.029* 0.001* 0.039* 0.019* 0.040 0.003 0.048 -0.001 0.065 -0.001
F-Test/
R-Sq 0.720 0.002 0.278 0.019 0.408 0.011 0.900 0.000 0.752 0.002
OCF 0.031 0.024 0.043 0.201 0.042 0.189 0.041 0.144 0.050 0.264
F-Test/
R-Sq 0.711 0.002 0.020 0.084 0.032 0.072 0.176 0.029 0.018 0.087
DEBT 0.033 -0.003 0.050 0.003 0.045 0.009 0.045 0.004 0.059 0.002
F-Test/
R-Sq 0.792 0.001 0.848 0.001 0.553 0.006 0.834 0.001 0.908 0.000
Source: authors’ calculations
Note: Signifi cant variable at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Tab. 8: Impact of selected variables on cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding share repurchase announcements
Tab. 9: Estimates of regression parameters for simple linear regression
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Taking into considerations the results, 
we should conclude that the study does not 
support any of the formulated hypotheses. In 
this way we do not support the hypothesis that 
young and innovative companies want to signal 
their undervaluation by implementing buyback 
programmes, as the companies on more 
developed countries do (e.g. Ikenberry et al. 
(1995); D’Mello and Shroff (2000); Mitchell and 
Dharmawan (2007); Akyol and Foo (2013)).
Conclusions
This paper investigates the market reaction 
to share repurchase announcements in 
Poland and the factors which determine the 
pattern of the market reaction. The analysis 
uses a sample of buyback announcements 
reported by companies listed on NewConnect, 
a new market fi nancing the growth of young 
companies with a large growth potential, over 
the period 2007-2016. 
Consistent with expectations, the market 
reacts positively to announcements of buyback 
programmes. Our results show that cumulative 
abnormal returns around the date of a share 
repurchase are signifi cant at standard levels 
of confi dence in the 3-, 5-, and 7-day event 
windows centered on the announcement dates. 
The highest statistically signifi cant value of 
CAAR is reached in the 5-day window (5.1%). 
Our results do not differ from the fi ndings for the 
main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
(Będowska-Sójka, 2003; Gryglewicz, 2004; 
Gurgul, 2005; Pieloch, 2011).
To examine what determines the market 
reaction to buyback announcements, fi rstly 
a bootstrap method was used. The results of 
the multivariate regression show no statistically 
signifi cant relationship between selected 
variables and the cumulative average abnormal 
returns surrounding share repurchase 
announcements.
The fi ndings of the univariate regression 
point to evidence of a signifi cant positive 
relationship between a company’s MTB ratio 
and both CAAR(-1;+1) and CAAR(-2;+2). 
However, the results are contrary to the initial 
assumption. These fi ndings suggest that the 
higher the market-to-book ratio, the higher the 
expected market reaction to a share repurchase 
announcement, but only in a very short term 
– the 3-day and 5-day windows. The results 
do not support the undervaluation hypothesis, 
as we expected, but are in line with Będowska-
Sójka (2003) and Gryglewicz (2004), who also 
did not support the undervaluation hypothesis 
for the main market of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. So, from this point of view, the 
reaction of NewConnect does not differ from 
that of the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
Taking into the consideration the results, we 
should conclude that the study does not support 
any of the known hypotheses that could explain 
this market reaction pattern.
However, the authors are aware that 
the conclusions of the research are limited. 
Our results could be related to the specifi c 
character of the NewConnect market, which as 
an alternative trading system in Poland is not 
as transparent as the main market. The second 
issue is the nature of the companies listed there, 
which are relatively small with a relatively high 
level of risk (with limited liquidity of shares).
This paper presents only the initial results 
of the study on the market reaction to share 
repurchase announcements, therefore further 
research should be conducted including other 
variables, which could explain the abnormal 
returns surrounding a share repurchase 
announcement. The limitation of our research 
indicates that new areas referring to share 
repurchases are still to be investigated, in 
particular identifying the differences in market 
reaction and reasons for market reaction with 
regard to the life cycle and size of the company, 
the ownership structure, including in the sample 
companies from both the main market of the 
WSE and NewConnect, the alternative trading 
system to the WSE. It would also be advisable 
to compare share repurchase implementations 
against dividend payments.
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Abstract
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF SHARE REPURCHASES – EVIDENCE FROM 
POLAND
Elżbieta Wrońska-Bukalska, Bogna Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak, Jiří Rozkovec
Announcements of open market repurchase programmes have recently become common not only 
in the United States but also in many other, less developed countries. The aim of the paper is to 
examine the market reaction to share repurchase announcements and to investigate the reasons 
for the market reaction. There is a good deal of research referring to the share repurchases, even in 
Poland, the originality of our approach is that we conducted our research on an alternative system 
of trading to the Warsaw Stock of Exchange, namely NewConnect. NewConnect is dedicated to 
young, small and innovative companies. We found it extremely interesting that such companies in 
need of external fi nancing take the decision to distribute cash and implement share repurchase.
The data was collected for 64 share repurchase announcements over the period 2007-2016. 
In this study cumulative average abnormal returns are applied to identify the market reaction. 
To investigate the factors which drive investor behaviour we applied the regressions model. We 
employed some explanatory variables describing the agency theory and signalling hypotheses: 
relative payout, market to book ratio, operational cash fl ow, and debt ratio. We found that cumulative 
average abnormal returns around the share repurchase date are signifi cant at standard levels 
of confi dence in all the analysed event windows. The results of the multivariate and univariate 
regression analyses do not support the undervaluation hypothesis, as we expected.
Key Words: Share repurchase, event study, market reaction, signaling theory, agency theory.
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